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Abstract 
 
This paper traces the changing notions of constraints in design and of systems since the mid-
20th century in the intersection of design theory and systems theory. Taking a second-order 
cybernetic perspective, the paper develops constraints as observer dependent, and it analyzes 
conditions under which constraints tend to be beneficial or detrimental. Ethical implications of 
constraints in design processes are established with reference to system boundaries. 
Constraint-oriented design is discussed as an alternative to goal-oriented design, and a method 
called constraint reversal is introduced as a strategy of deliberate defiance of constraints to 
support design exploration. 
 
Introduction: Constraint as a Systems Concept 
 
Amongst the first to explicitly address the role of constraints in design was mathematician and 
systems analyst Horst Rittel, professor and head of the Ulm School of Design (HfG) and later 
professor at the University of California, Berkeley. Probably best known for the distinction 
between “wicked” and “tame” problems that he proposed together with Webber [1], Rittel was 
also amongst the first to apply a “systems” approach to design. Rittel is thus an early 
representative of thinkers in the intersection between design theory and systems theory. 
Second-order cybernetic design theory is a contemporary development of this intersection, 
represented for example by Glanville [2], Jonas [3] and Krippendorff [4]. In the following, the 
development of the second-order cybernetic perspective will be taken as a vantage point from 
which to examine the role of constraints in design. 
 
Constraint and Variety 
 
Rittel frequently referred to cybernetician Ross Ashby [5] and his work on variety. Based on the 
notion of variety, Rittel proposed a fundamental division of design activities that remained 
central to his teaching throughout his career [6]: Design entails “The generation of variety, and 
the reduction of variety” [7]. Ashby’s work on variety in cybernetics gave prominence to the 
notion of constraint, which he defined as a “relation between two sets, [which] occurs when the 
variety that exists under one condition is less than the variety that exists under another” [8]. As 
an example, Ashby offers (British) traffic lights, which are constrained so that only four 
combinations of the on/off states of red, yellow, and green occur (one condition), whereas eight 
such combinations would be available (other condition) if the three on/off states could vary 
independently. Rittel then defines constraints as “certain values of the decision variables or 
design variables [that] are excluded”. Using a spatial metaphor for variety he continues: “[a]ll the 
knowledge the designer has, of a scientific or professional character, can be plotted into the 
decision space as constraints, for example a ‘maximum weight 5 tons’ constraint would cut off 
all solutions above that figure” [9]. 
 
Important distinctions have to be drawn between the traffic lights example and the decision not 
to consider weights above some threshold in a design process. One is the distinction between 
mechanisms and human decision making. Another is the distinction between processes that are 
constrained from the outside and processes that are constrained from the inside [10]. This 
echoes Miller who notes that “[c]ertain alternative solutions are eliminated for an organization’s 
decider by constraints on it, either from inside the system or from outside” [11]. As will be shown 
below, the question of what resides within or outside of a system depends on the understanding 
of the term system and, according to the second-order cybernetic understanding, on the 
system’s observer. The traffic lights are a mechanism which is constrained from the outside, by 
traffic rules and those who implement traffic lights. The design decision to consider weights 
below 5 tons only is made by a human acting within the decision process in question. The 
mechanism/human distinction and the inside/outside distinction are related in as far as humans 
appear to be more capable than mechanisms to engage appositely with what lies outside their 
systemic boundaries. 
 
From positivist origins, both cybernetic theories and Rittel’s theories of design have evolved 
over time. To develop a differentiated view of constraints in design, it is necessary to trace 
briefly the changing understanding of the systems notion (including ‘systems boundary’, which is 
essential to the inside/outside distinction drawn above) during the second half of the past 
century. 
 
Systems, Observers and Boundaries 
 
As an early definition, von Bertalanffy describes the term system as a “(set) of elements 
standing in interrelation” [12]. This notion was taken up by early design researchers who initially 
tended to apply the term system to outcomes of design, i.e., to parts or components making up 
products [13]. In this view, which is still encountered in systems engineering and the 
engineering design fields, constraints are frequently used to refer to limits imposed on variable 
elements of products, such as moving parts. 
 
Others further differentiate von Bertalanffy’s definition by recognizing the existence of systems 
in contexts or environments, and the interaction of systems with their environments via inputs 
and outputs that cross a given system’s boundaries. Further differentiations ascribe more 
characteristics to systems, i.e., goal-oriented systems [14] and self-perpetuating systems [15]. 
Weinberg introduces a subjective, observer-dependent aspect by defining system as “[a] way of 
looking at the world” [16], and Rittel states that a system “reflects someone’s understanding of 
something” (“Ein System reflektiert jemandes Verständins von etwas”) [17]. 
 
Rittel’s recognition of systems as observer-dependent is one aspect of his proposal for a 
second-generation of the systems approach, of design theory and of design methods, based on 
his and others’ initial development, and later rejection of more positivist and more determinist 
“first generation” ones [18]. This development is somewhat analogous to the recognition of 
observer dependence (amongst other aspects) in cybernetics, i.e., the development of second-
order cybernetics. As an aside, it should be mentioned that there are other notable analogies 
between Rittel’s move from first-generation to second-generation design theories and the move 
from first order to second-order cybernetics. Rittel’s description of the designerly condition as a 
“symmetry of ignorance” [19], for example, resembles the symmetry of conversations [20] and 
the value of ignorance (besides knowing) noted in second-order cybernetic design theory [21]. 
 
In second-order cybernetics, systems are understood as bounded by the way observers 
distinguish them. The systems notion, and along with it the systems boundary notion, thus 
becomes subjective, corresponding to Spencer-Brown’s dictum: “Draw a distinction.” [22] Brün, 
accordingly states: “A system is not something that exists objectively in space or time or 
anywhere. A system is the result of a look at a collection of stipulated elements. Stipulated in 
that I say which elements I will look at.” [23] Instead of phrases like “defining a system” or 
“specifying a system”, some second-order cyberneticians hence use the more active phrase: the 
observer “looks a system” (rather than “looks at a system”). [24] 
 
One may, for instance, choose to consider a person, say a child, as a system in the sense that 
the child is an organism made up of organs (a set of elements standing in interrelation). 
Alternatively, one may choose to recognize the child’s dependency on her mother, without 
whose care and feeding the child would not survive. Now, the child and (at least aspects of) the 
mother form a system. The observer has the freedom and responsibility to choose what is 
relevant and considered as parts of a “looked” system. Analogously, a designer may choose to 
approach a design challenge at the level of an apartment building or, realizing some broader 
implications and dependencies, at the scale of an apartment block or a city block. Rittel explains: 
“[e]very wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem” [25], and “[t]he 
choice of [a wicked problem's] explanation determines the nature of the problem's resolution” 
[26]. 
 
In this view, “system” is understood as whatever set of elements an observer considers as 
acting together—for example, following a common goal (a teleological approach). Oftentimes, 
systems we look (at) are bounded by physical skins, coatings, housings or some similar 
demarcation of a boundary. The above-mentioned child, for example, has skin and clothing, 
cells have membranes, birds’ eggs have shells, computers have cases, buildings have façades, 
communities use buildings and so on. This can be explained by taking these systems as having 
“evolved” or developed, or as having been given armor and structure to protect them from 
destructive forces so as to maintain their coherence and integrity. The skin of a child may likely 
coincide with the boundary an observer projects onto the child system seen as an autonomous 
entity, because the forces that brought forth human skin, themselves acting as observers, may 
have also approached the human body as an autonomous entity. If, however, an observer 
chooses not to see the child as autonomous but as dependent on her mother, then that 
observer is free to project a boundary which intersects with the boundaries of the mother. This 
boundary now does not coincide with any physical hull. It is a projection brought forth by an 
observer’s way of looking. This projected boundary, regardless of whether it coincides with a 
physical boundary or not, is the systems boundary as approached by second-order cybernetics. 
In this way, in the second-order cybernetic view, systems and their boundaries are observer-
dependent, and in principle independent from physical configuration [27]. 
 
Constrained Design and Designed Constraints 
 
By conceptualizing variety available to design activity as “design space” available for exploration, 
Rittel uses the term constraint to describe what could be called “no-go zones” within design 
spaces—design options to be excluded from further consideration. Thereby, the systems notion 
is applied to the design process as opposed to the design product. We have thus arrived at two 
kinds of boundaries: One bounds elements of systems such as the parties and influences acting 
in a design process or components of a design product. This kind of boundary delimits that 
which is considered as a system – for example, designers in a design conversation (process) or 
components considered for integration (product). The other bounds the degrees of freedom 
available for exploration. This kind of boundary delimits the conceptual territories available for 
design processes to unfold.  
 
While these two kinds of boundaries may be considered as distinct, Heylighen proposes a very 
tight and abstract definition of the systems notion, which brings constraints, variety and systems 
together in a simple relationship by defining “a system as a constraint on variety” [28]. In this 
view, the two kinds of boundaries considered here appear less distinct because both can be 
described with this definition. Moreover, the two kinds of boundaries, even if viewed as distinct 
from each other, are likely to affect each other: No-go zones in design processes contribute to 
choices of elements and attributes of the product, while considered product elements and 
attributes contribute to the establishment of no-go zones in the process. In both cases, however, 
variety is reduced, i.e., possibilities are eliminated. 
 
With constraints thus reputed to impinge on creative freedom, the question arises whether they 
are desirable or not—that is, whether they are beneficial or harmful. There is a far-reaching 
consensus amongst designers and design theorists that, perhaps counter-intuitively, reduced 
freedom is not necessarily harmful in design. Dorst notes that design problems can be rather 
open and disorienting, and that constraints can help alleviate the resulting need for “a great deal 
of conceptual juggling skills’’ [29]. Glanville states that “[reducing variety by way of constraints] 
provides an advantage: many have experienced paralysis when faced with seemingly limitless 
variety” [30]. This echoes what painter van Gogh wrote in a letter to his brother: “You don’t know 
how paralyzing it is, that stare from a blank canvas that says to the painter you can’t do anything” 
[31]. Total freedom (vast variety) seems to offer unfavorable conditions for creative processes, 
and its effects can be as devastating as those of a total absence of freedom (no variety). 
Constraints (reducing variety) can also offer catalytic benefits in the creative process. Boden 
notes that “far from being the antithesis of creativity, constraints on thinking are what make it 
possible” [32]. Gänshirt notes that design constraints can offer a “disciplining” effect [33], which, 
paradoxically, even if arbitrarily self-imposed, can have desirable effects on creativity [34]. 
Dadich [35] confirms this from an applied perspective, explaining the use of constraints in 
magazine design. The ability of designers to deal with vast variety seems to come with 
experience. Design educators, accordingly, tend to constrain studio assignments for first-year 
design students extensively and to allow increasing degrees of freedom in assignments for 
higher years. Similarly, experienced designers can often be observed to deliberately (self-) 
impose constraints as a creative tool when addressing unmanageably large variety. These 
might be constraints of many kinds, including habits, agendas, idiosyncrasies and other ways of 
compressing “solution spaces”, which may also offer benefits by contributing to recognizable 
style and identity within bodies of creative work. 
 
The difference between novice designers finding their assignments constrained by their 
educators and senior designers choosing to constrain their own work raises the question of 
where design constraints originate. A useful demarcation to address this question has already 
been introduced above with the systemic inside/outside distinction. Some designers may find it 
convenient or appropriate (due, say, to educational influences or professional power structures) 
to take constraints as naturally given by higher forces and therefore as non-negotiable. 
Examples include the uncritical acceptance of problem statements, user need specifications set 
out by marketing departments, limits of manufacturability, costing frameworks, and regulatory 
codes. Being in charge of distinguishing and bounding the relevant systemic elements and 
spaces considered in design projects, designers are responsible to at least consider re-
negotiating imposed constraints in one way or another. For example, problem statements can 
be re-formulated, target user groups can be re-considered, manufacturing processes can be 
developed, price points can be challenged and cases can (hopefully) be made where the spirit 
of regulatory codes is obeyed while their letters are violated. Rittel explains: “[E]very constraint 
or limitation I pose on my action space is a decision, or at least an implicit indication of 
resignation” [36], and he notes: “You can always seek an exception” [37].  
 
The possibility to transcend designed design spaces thus appears less as a matter of creative 
freedom than as a matter of ethical responsibility. Von Foerster [38] distinguishes between 
ethics (“I shall...”) and moral codes (“thou shalt not...”) based on exactly this distinction: do 
constraints originate within (ethics) or from outside (moral code)? The ethical implication for 
design and design education is obvious: Only when the freedom to make decisions is granted is 
there an obligation to take responsibility for one’s decisions. If this freedom is not granted, then 
there is no obligation to take responsibility for design choices and actions (and thus anything 
may be excused with the so-called Nuremberg defense: “I was just following orders!”). 
 
 
The Ethics of Constraint: Three Scenarios 
 
Despite the ethical necessity to negotiate design constraints from within, the imposition (and 
oftentimes unquestioning acceptance) of constraints from outside is not uncommon. Three 
scenarios come to mind. 
 
One is the already-mentioned educational scenario. Since the variety of unconstrained “design 
spaces” can overwhelm novice designers who have yet to learn to constrain their design space 
explorations by themselves, design educators impose constraints, somewhat from the outside. 
(There is an element of conspiracy in the relationship between design students and design 
tutors, the degree of which renders the question of whether educationally motivated constraints 
originate inside or outside of projects somewhat arguable.) This strategy should be no more 
than a temporary prosthesis that is used until students have gradually established habits, 
confidence and values that allow self-constraining, thereby making unmanageable variety more 
manageable. 
 
Another one is the industrial scenario in which professional designers serve within power 
hierarchies. No-go zones within design spaces are dictated to designers and remain largely 
non-negotiable because hierarchical organizations tend to listen upwards, not downwards [39], 
and (usually profit-oriented) design decisions taken at higher levels of authority take priority. 
Hopefully, the fields and corridors left open for exploration within design spaces in this way are 
sufficient to still allow professional designers to practice in ways that are consistent with their 
values and ethics. But, this is not always the case. 
 
Yet another is the computational design research scenario in which digital design process 
models (mechanisms) are investigated for academic research purposes such as investigations 
into design space modeling [40] or so-called multiple-constraint satisfaction [41]. Since 
computers cannot (in the human sense) re-consider value judgments, they cannot re-consider 
algorithmic no-go zones (in the designerly sense) unless instructed to do so – by humans 
looking in from the outside. This is easily resolved by re-considering the boundaries of the 
designing system in question so that the human is included: “The computer is only an arc of a 
larger circuit which always includes a man and an environment from which information is 
received and upon which efferent messages from the computer have effect” [42]. Viewed in this 
way, constraints are set by the human, from within. 
 
From Goal-Oriented to Constraint-Oriented Process 
 
With the transitions from first to second generation design methods, and from first to second 
order cybernetics, systems-based design theory transcended the original teleological (goal-
oriented) focus of early systems and control theory, moving  towards a conversational focus. 
This section contrasts the teleological approach with the conversational approach. 
 
Teleological processes are based on control and move towards defined goals. Control is 
achieved when those engaged in design processes (consider the straight-forward scenario of 
two designers) are engaged with each other as controller and controlled. The key requirement 
for this kind of engagement is that the variety in the controller must be identical to the variety in 
the controlled, so as to eliminate any ambiguity in the engagement. With defined goals, it is 
possible to define suitable paths toward the goals. Goal-oriented processes move along such 
paths and check deviations from them along the way. These deviations are considered errors, 
prompting corrective measures. In a goal-oriented process, attention stays focused on the future 
desired state and constraints are treated as obstacles that have to be navigated while pursuing 
that goal: goals give direction, while constraints limit freedom. 
 
Conversational processes, alternatively, are based on interaction and avoidance of undesirable 
outcomes (constraints, rather than goals). Interaction is achieved when those engaged in design 
processes (consider again the straight-forward scenario of two designers) are engaged with 
each other on an equal footing. A key feature of this kind of engagement is that it changes the 
variety of the conversants so as to get, at least to some extent, out of control [43]. Focusing on 
avoidance (constraints) leaves open “corridors” and “fields” of possibilities within the solution 
space. Constraints, in this approach, do not necessarily dominate movement but, as described 
above, may offer benefits of increased manageability and creative catalysis while still allowing 
some freedom for exploration. In a constraint-oriented process, attention stays focused on all 
perceived and possible constraints, recognizing them not as obstacles to be navigated but as 
enabling of ideas that would otherwise not be imagined. Outcomes remain floating (uncertain) 
within the space defined by the constantly changing constraints: constraints give direction, while 
goals limit freedom. 
 
The question arises of how applied design processes can terminate in the absence of defined 
goals. How do we know when to stop? Arguably, design processes may experience difficulty 
stopping “from within” (there is almost always potential for incorporating additional ideas into a 
design). As Rittel [44] explains, applied design processes depend on the availability of 
resources (time and money, essentially), and they terminate when these resources run out. 
Separate from the limitation on resources, the potential contribution (variety) of new ideas in the 
design process decays as a design approaches a stable configuration, at which time terminating 
procedures may be applied to produce the finishing touches. These terminating procedures can 
be seen as self-imposed constraints that serve to avoid prolonging a process in which the 
designers are no longer interested (their work is done), as well as to avoid running out of 
resources.  
 
It is possible to engage in goal-oriented and constraint-oriented processes simultaneously (in 
parallel, so to speak). Since they are opposing approaches, such a dual process is best 
described as a dialectical one. Constraint-oriented processes are primarily concerned with what 
one does not want, rather than with what, specifically, one wants. They are, thus, approaches of 
avoidance of undesirable outcomes more than achievements of desirable outcomes.  
However, any goal can be turned into a constraint, and any constraint into a goal. Avoidance of 
undesirable outcomes can be treated as a goal, for example. Nonetheless, there is a 
fundamental difference in thinking between the two approaches, with a goal-oriented approach 
representing a point (or vector) way of thinking in which future achievement is the driving force 
and a constraint-oriented approach representing a spatial (or even topological) way of thinking 
in which avoidance in the here and now is the driving force. The former focuses on probable 
outcomes, and narrowing them, the latter on possible outcomes, and expanding them. There is 
also a difference in the ways of dealing with time: a goal-oriented approach relying on a linear, 
present to future, concept of time, and a constraint-oriented approach focusing on an always 
changing present (multiple concepts of time).  
 
We contend that the “desirability” of outcomes realized under a constraint-oriented approach, to 
the people who will engage with and be impacted by the designs implemented, can be far 
greater than those realized under a goal-oriented approach. Of course, this depends on how 
desirability is defined, and that is where social, political and economic agendas come into play. 
A constraint-oriented approach lends itself naturally to a true participative/democratic process 
[45]. 
 
Constraint Reversal 
 
Constraints acting on design processes can, by way of deliberate defiance, be used as a design 
exploration strategy without necessarily compromising the values that motivate given sets of 
constraints. This may be valuable simply as a creative idea generation technique, or as a 
means to widen “corridors” and “fields” in constraint-oriented exploration processes if they are 
considered too narrow, or as a device for addressing overbearing constraints imposed from 
outside the design process. This move, which we refer to as “constraint reversal”, challenges 
the context of given design specifications and constraints, somewhat along the lines of a 
proposal made by Brün [46]. Based on this strategy, a statement aiming to establish a no-go 
zone in the “design space” is inverted, and then conditions are sought under which the inverted 
statement would be desirable. Consider as an example an urban planning project in which a 
design constraint is established with the statement: Motor traffic must not be obstructed. Instead 
of adhering to this constraint, designers might ask the following: What would be the conditions 
under which motor traffic obstruction would be desirable? This could lead to design proposals, 
such as the establishment of a pedestrian-only area, which would in principle constitute an 
obstruction of motor traffic, but not necessarily be at odds with the values that motivated the 
original constraint against motor traffic obstruction. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we first discussed the development of the changing notion of constraint in design 
along with the changing notion of systems since the mid-20th century in the intersection of 
design theory and systems theory. We showed this development starting with Rittel’s adoption 
of the notion of variety from Ashby and leading towards Heylighen's definition of “system as a 
constraint on variety”. Our review of design-theoretical discussions of constraints shows a far-
reaching consensus that, contrary to the common way of thinking of constraints as limiting 
freedom for creative exploration, giving attention to constraints in design can enable the creative 
process. We described the goal-oriented approach in which goals give direction while 
constraints limit freedom in contrast to the constraint-oriented approach in which constraints 
give direction while goals limit freedom. A key benefit of the constraint-oriented approach from a 
design perspective is that it offers “corridors” and “fields” for exploration rather than a narrow, 
predetermined path. 
 
A consequence for design education of the constraint-oriented approach is the introduction of a 
way of thinking that is not goal-oriented, not achievement-focused, but rather one in which 
constraints are treated as opportunities and outcomes as secondary to the process. If everyone 
thought this way, we would arguably have a quite different society and world than what we have 
now. The educational process does, however, have to recognize that we do not live in that world; 
and, if students are going to be able to make a living in the current world, they also have to learn 
how to incorporate into their designs the “goals” of those who are footing the bill. Learning how 
to turn the goals of these privileged individuals into desires treated as constraints would be a 
part of a constraint-oriented approach to design education. Therefore, in spite of the current 
socio-economic-political structures of modern societies, designers can still be creative and 
arrive at designs that point in desirable directions, even if the designs themselves are not direct 
forces for social change in that direction. 
 
Finally, we introduced the strategy of constraint reversal, which allows creative exploration by 
means of constraint defiance without necessarily compromising the values that motivated the 
constraints in question in the first place. We have thus developed the role of constraints in 
design from non-negotiable to negotiable, and further to negotiation-provoking, implying a shift 
from product (oriented) design to social(ly oriented) design. 
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